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1988 Review of the European Court of
Justice: Price Restraints, Patent Rights,
and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

Increasing attention is focusing on the impending unification of

the European Economic Community (EEC or Community) internal
market in 1992.1 The Court of Justice of the European Communities

(Court) seems poised to provide an increasingly important role as
final arbiter of Community policy. 2 Some critics have suggested,

1. The recently adopted Single European Act, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986), CouNcrc
oF nam EURoPEAN Comawmrr=s, SNGLE EuROPEA" Act (1986); see also New Developments, 4

Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4 95,027 at 51,098 (citing Council Press Release (No. 8677) (1988)),
affirms the Member States' commitment to greater EEC integration:
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the
internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992...
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty.
Single European Act, Title 2, Ch. 2, Sec. 2, art. 8A, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 510-11.
2. See Weiler, Review Essay, 24 COMMON MKT L. REv. 555, 556 (1987). The mandate of
the European Court of Justice is set out in the three "Community" treaties which together create
the European Communities. Treaty Establishing a European Economic Community, 2 U.N.T.S.
294-97, 1-3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11 100-5406, arts. 164-188 [hereinafter EEC Treaty];
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 295 U.N.T.S. 259, 1 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 101, arts. 136-160 [hereinafter EAEC Treaty]; Treaty Instituting the European
Coal and Steel Community, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 101, arts. 31-45
[hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. Although each treaty provides for its own judiciary, a convention
signed contemporaneously with the Treaty of Rome provided common jurisdiction in a "single
Court of Justice." Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, 3
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 5100, at 4232-4233, arts. 3-4.
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty defines the Court's power of review. It states, in pertinent part:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission
other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in
actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement
of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of power.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings
against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the
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however, that the Court has already gone beyond its original man-

date. 3 One commentator has even gone so far as to describe the

Court's "activism" as "revolting judicial behavior." ' 4 Whichever view
ultimately prevails, it remains essential to consider the implications
of today's Court decisions as the Community prepares for greater
economic and social integration in the next decade.
This article examines three areas of recent Court action which
constitute significant developments for international legal practitioners. 5 An introductory section first examines the impact of the creation
of the Court of First Instance. The article then addresses develop-

ments in Court jurisprudence in the areas of restrictive pricing
practices, patent rights, and the extraterritorial application of EEC

competition provisions.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception, the Court has defined Community policy in
conjunction with the three other administrative bodies of the EEC-

the Assembly, 6 the Council, 7 and the Commission.8 Given the limited

form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and
individual concern to the former.
EEC Treaty, art. 173, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 3833. For a recent discussion of the future
role of the Court in light of the Single European Act, see Glaesner, The Single European Act:
Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FoUHAm Irrr'L L. J. 446, 470 (1986-1987).
3. See, e.g., H. RAsmussm, ON LAW AND PoUcY INTH EuRoPEAN CouT OF Jus'nCE
(1986); Weiler, The Community System." The Dual Characterof Supranationalism, YEARBOOK OF
EuoPrAN LAW 267 (1981).
4. H. RAsmussEN, supra note 3, at "508.
5. For a similar review of recent developments emanating from the Council and Commission,
see Recent Development, 1987 Review of the European Economic Community Council and
Commission: Securities Regulation, Franchising Agreements, and Knowhow Licensing, 1 TRANsNAT'L LAW.

281 (1988).

6. The Assembly, or-as it has come to be known-the European Parliament, has only in
recent years begun to play a more influential role in EEC policymaking. Its original mandate
limited it primarily to consultative functions and the supervision of Commission legislation. See
EEC Treaty, arts. 138-44, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
4305-36 at 3416-48 (establishing the
powers of the Assembly). The Assembly has since acquired some of the characteristics of a
legislative body, having been empowered with the direct election of delegates from Member States.
See Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal
Suffrage, Council Decision (No. 76/787) (1976), 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4308 at 342024. The Assembly has also assumed an increasingly authoritative role in Community budget
oversight. See EEC Treaty, art. 203, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
5021 at 3413 (budget
procedure).
7. The role of the Council, as specified in Article 145 of the EEC Treaty, 3 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH)
4401 at 3503, is to ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the
Member States and to make decisions of Community policy and law. Id. The Council is comprised
of a ministerial representative from each of the Member States, normally either the foreign minister
or the minister responsible for the specific issue being addressed. EEC Treaty, art. 146, 3 Common
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legislative role of the Assembly, however, European policy pron-

ouncements emanate largely from the Council, the Commission, and

the Court. The Court's role in making policy is twofold. 9 On one
hand, the Court reviews interpretations and application of the EEC
Treaty by the other Community institutions. 10 On the other hand,
the Court interprets and applies Treaty provisions in areas where

other Community institutions have not acted.1"

The role of the Court was significantly altered in 1988 with the

establishment of the Court of First Instance. 12 Owing to the heavy
burden of technically complex complaints, many requiring decisions

not only on questions of law but also on questions of fact, and a
full docket of EEC civil servant disputes, the Court had requested
the creation of a lower court of original jurisdiction. 3 In October
1988, the Council adopted a decision creating the Court of First
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4 4405-6 at 3507-9. While most Council acts require a unanimous or qualified
majority vote, the Single European Act introduced the validity of simple majority voting in certain
areas such as directives and regulations to establish the freedom of movement of workers. See
EEC Treaty, art. 148, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 44 4415-6 at 3510-14.
8. The Commission functions broadly to ensure that provisions of the Treaty are carried
out by other EEC institutions and Member States. See EEC Treaty, art. 155, 3 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 4471-2 at 3603-6. In carrying out its mandate, the Commission is empowered to
bring suit in the Court of Justice for alleged violations of Treaty obligations by Member States.
See EEC Treaty, art. 169, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4616 at 3819. The 17 Commission
members are appointed by Member States, but are challenged to exercise their duties independently
of Member State allegiances. See EEC Treaty, arts. 157-60, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11
4476-96 at 3610-19.
9. The jurisdiction of the Court is broadly defted to encompass four levels of review: (1)
complaints lodged against a Member State by either the Commission or another Member State
based on Community law, EEC Treaty, arts. 169-171, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4 4616-31
at 3819-31; (2) review and potential nullification of Council or Commission decisions or regulations
when challenged by another Community institution, Member State, individual or legal person,
EEC Treaty, art. 173, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 41 4635-36 at 3833-44; (3) preliminary rulings
on aspects of Community law solicited by national courts, EEC Treaty, art. 177, 3 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14 4655-56 at 3835-66; and (4) administrative actions brought by Community staff
members for review of employment policies, EEC Treaty, art. 179, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14 4665-66 at 3868-69.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Court of First Instance is Established, 282 EuRoPa 43 (1988).
The jurisdiction of the newly formed court will include:
- disputes between the Communities and their civil servants;
actions brought against the Communities by natural or legal persons concerning the
implementation of the competition rules applicable to enterprises; and
actions brought against the Commission by an enterprise or association of enterprises
relating to matters covered by the ECSC Treaty (such as levies, production, prices,
restrictive agreements, etc.).
New Developments, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,027 at 51,099 (Jan. 1989).
The Court of First Instance may also take over original jurisdiction from the Court in cases
concerning dumping and subsidies, if, after a review of the court's first two years of activity, the
Council acts on such a proposal before it. Id.
13. Glaesner, supra note 2, at 470.
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Instance.1 4 While the Court will lose its original jurisdiction in some
areas, the appellate process ensures review of cases appealed from
the Court of First Instance.' 5 Thus, while several of the cases dis-

cussed below would not now come before the Court (at least initially),
the reasoning and precedential value of the decisions remain unchanged.

II.
A.

RESTRICTrvE PRICING PRACTICES

Introduction to EEC Competition Principles Affecting Pricing
Practices

The maintenance of free competition is a central tenet of the
Community goal of establishing a common European market.' 6 Restrictive pricing practices are, therefore, singled out for attack because

14. See EuRoPE, supra note 12, at 43; New Developments, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
95,027 at 51,098. For recent reviews of the Single European Act, see Glaesner, supra note 2, at
470; Schermers, The European Court of First Instance, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 541 (1988).
The legal basis for the Council's decision was incorporated in the Sioi EUROPEAN ACT, Council
of the European Communities (1986). Articles 4, 11 and 26 of the Act amended the relevant
sections of the EEC originating treaties (Article 32d ECSC Treaty, 261 U.N.T.S 165-66; Article
168A EEC Treaty, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4613 at 3818; and Article 140A EAEC Treaty,
295 U.N.T.S. 99):
1. At the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the Commission and the
European Parliament, the Council may, acting unanimously, attach to the Court of
Justice a court with jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance, subject to a
right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only and in accordance with
the conditions laid down by the Statute, certain classes of action or proceeding brought
by natural or legal persons. That court shall not be competent to hear and determine
actions brought by Member States or by Community institutions or questions referred
for a preliminary ruling under Article [41 ECSC Treaty, 261 U.N.T.S. 171; 177 EEC
Treaty, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4655 at 3853; 150 EAEC Treaty, 295 U.N.T.S.
102].
2. The Council, following the procedure laid down in paragraph 1, shall determine the
composition of that court and adopt the necessary adjustments and additional provisions
to the Statute of the Court of Justice. Unless the Council decides otherwise, the
provisions of this Treaty relating to the Court of Justice, in particular the provisions
of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, shall apply to that court.
3. The members of that court shall be chosen from persons whose independence is
beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to judicial office;
they shall be appointed by common accord of the Governments of the Member States
for a term of six years. The membership shall be partially renewed every three years.
Retiring members shall be eligible for reappointment.
4. That court shall establish its rules of procedure in agreement with the Court of
Justice. Those rules shall require the unanimous approval of the Council.
Single European Act, arts. 4, 11, 26, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 508, 510, 516.
15. New Developments, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,027 at 51,099. "Any party which
has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions may bring an appeal limited to
points of law before the Court of Justice against decisions of the Court of First Instance." Id.
16. See generally EEC Treaty, arts. 1-8, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 121 at 161-63.
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of the central role prices play in maintaining competition. 7
Regulation of restrictive pricing practices, as with Community
competition policy in general, falls largely upon Articles 85 and 86
of the EEC Treaty. Article 85(1) prohibits those activities which
affect trade between Member States and which either prevent, restrict,

or distort competition within the Community.

8

Any agreements

entered into which violate these prohibitions are void under Article

85(2).1 9 Article 85(3), however, provides an important exemption
clause. 20 So long as a particular agreement or practice does not
impose otherwise avoidable restrictions on competition and "contrib-

utes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers

a fair share of the resulting benefits," it is exempted from the
prohibitions of Article 85(1).21

17. G. BELLAMY & G. CmD, CoMMoN MARKET LAW OF COMPETION § 4-002 at 158 (3rd
ed. 1987).
18. Article 85(1) specifically enumerates various activities which are considered "incompatible with the common market:"
*..all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
with the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
EEC Treaty, art. 85(1), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2005 at 1531.
19. EEC Treaty, art. 85(2), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2031 at 1657.
20. Article 85(3) states:
The provisions of [Article 85(1)] may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case
of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of
a substantial part of the products in question.
EEC Treaty, art. 85(3), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2051 at 1661.
21. Id. Several Commission Regulations have come to play a major role in defining the
permissible scope of anti-competitive practices, primarily through specific group or "block"
exemptions. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1983/83 on Exclusive Distribution Agreements,
26 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L173) 1 (1983) (officially corrected in 26 O.J. Eur. CoMM. (No.
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Restrictive pricing practices are practically per se violations of
Article 85(1) given their inherently anti-competitive nature.2 Article
85(1) states specifically that agreements or practices which "directly
or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices" and which affect trade
between Member States are incompatible with the competition rules
of the Common Market.2 Exemptions under Article 85(3) for restrictive pricing practices, as provided to some distribution agreements2
2
for example, are thus exceptional. 1
Article 8626 complements Article 85 by, among other things, prohibiting enterprises from employing restrictive pricing practices in
conjunction with a dominant position27 in a particular product marL281) 24 (1983)), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2730; Commission Regulation 1984/83 on
Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 26 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L173) 5 (1983) (officially corrected
in 26 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L281) 24 (1983)), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2733;
Commission Regulation 2349/84 on Patent Licensing Agreements, 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No.
L219) 15 (1984) (officially corrected in 27 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. LI13) 34 (1984)), 2 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2747 [hereinafter Patent Licensing Regulation]; Commission Regulation
123/85 on Motor Vehicle Distribution Agreements, 28 O.J. EUm. Comm. (LI5) 16 (1985), 2
Common Mkt. Rep. § 2751; Commission Regulation 418/85 on Research & Development
Agreements, 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L53) 5 (1985), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2753.
22. I. VON BAEL & J-F. BELLis, CoaPETroN LAW OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
§ 5.02[2], at 5-4 (1988); BELLAY & CHILD, supra note 17, § 4-002 at 158.
23. EEC Treaty, art 85(l)(a), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2005 at 1531.
24. Distribution agreements are commonly employed by product suppliers-often those
distributing sophisticated consumer goods such as electronic equipment-who wish to maintain
control over the retail dealers ultimately selling their product. Demaret, Patents, Territorial
Restrictions and EEC Law, 1986 FoRDHAm CRPORATE LAW INsTITUTE (B. Hawk, ed. 1987)
at 149-150. For an example of a recent case regarding the scope of the Commission's motor
vehicle exception to article 85(1), see V.A.G. France v. Etablissement Magne, 1986 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. _;
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,390.
25. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 17, § 4-002 at 158; VoN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note
22, § 5.02[2] at 5-4.
26. Article 86 states in pertinent part:
... [A]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
EEC Treaty, art. 86, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2101 at 1675.
27. A dominant position has been defined as "a position of economic strength enjoyed
by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the
relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers." See United Brands v. Commission,
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8429 at 7708.
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ket. 28 For an Article 86 violation to exist, there must be an abuse of
a dominant position. 29 In the context of restrictive pricing practices,

an abuse may exist where an enterprise engages in discriminatory,
predatory, or excessive pricing. 0

For restrictive pricing practices to constitute violations of either
Article 85 or 86, they must rise to the level of "affecting trade
between member states." ' 31 Pricing restrictions are most blatant and

most susceptible to attack by the Commission and Court when
executed by companies located in different countries or by export-

oriented companies in the same country.3 2 The negative impact on
interstate trade, as prohibited by Articles 85 and 86, is clearly evident

in such cases. Where an alleged competition violation does not affect
trade between Member States, the relevant competition law of the
33
affected Member State is determinative.

Restrictive pricing practices are as varied as the number of alleged
pricing violations brought before the Commission and Court each

year. The most blatant or "direct" forms of pricing practices include
price fixing agreements, 34 resale price maintenance agreements, 35 dis-

28. EEC Treaty, art. 86(c), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2101 at 1675.
29. Temple Lang has provided a three-part definition of what constitutes an "abuse" of
dominant position:
(1) "exploitative abuses" are those in which a dominant enterprise takes advantage of its
market power to obtain advantages or impose burdens not otherwise *available in conditions
of effective competition;
(2) "anti-competitive abuses" arise where a dominant enterprise uses its power to restrict the
effective competition of similar product producers; and
(3) "reprisal abuses" are attempts by a dominant enterprise to damage or seriously interfere
with a competing enterprise.
Lang, Monopolisation and the Definition of "Abuse" of a Dominant Position under Article
86 EEC Treaty, 16 CommaoN MKT. L. REv. 345, 363-364 (1979).
30. For an example of discriminatory pricing implemented in violation of Article 86 see
infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
31. See supra notes 18 and 26.
32. VoN BAEL & BaLLis, supra note 22, § 5.02[2], at 5-5. Practices held by the Commission
and Court to violate Article 85 have included: (1) agreements between companies located in a
single Member State which do not expressly involve import or export between Member States,
but which have the effect of compartmentalizing or protecting domestic markets. See, e.g.
Comm'n Decision, Vereeniging van Cemethandelaren (VCH), O.J. Eus. Commns. (No. L13) 34
(1971), [Jan. 1970-Dec. 1972 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
9492 (on appeal VCH v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 977, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8179; and (2) agreements executed by enterprises in
non-EEC countries regarding imports into one or more Member States; see e.g. infra text
accompanying notes 237-90 discussing A. Ahlstr6m Oy and Others v. Commission (the
"Woodpulp" cases).
33. For a recent Court decision applying this principle, see infra text accompanying note
152.
34. Price-fiing agreements arise where either two or more competitors or a manufacturer
and distributor agree on specified retail prices to be charged for a product. Such agreements
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criminatory pricing,3 6 predatory pricing,3 7 and excessive pricing. 8
Other less obvious or "indirect" pricing practices, though apparently

having little connection to "prices" in the narrow sense of the term,
often constitute artificial price restraints. Typically, these are profit

41
margin restrictions, discounts, 39 credit terms4° or rebates.
The Commission and Court invoke both Articles 85 and 86 in
response to restrictive pricing practices. As reflected in the two

examples which follow, the major distinction between the application
of Articles 85 and 86 is the degree of market impact necessary to

typically arise in "horizontal" settings, i.e., between competitors at the same level of product
development or distribution, as a means of maintaining artificially high industry-wide prices.
In contrast, "vertical" price-fing agreements are those entered into between traders at different
product levels, e.g., between a supplier and distributor, often with the aim of maintaining
specified resale prices. In practice, price-fixing arrangements frequently take on both horizontal
and vertical characteristics, as in the case of producers concerting amongst themselves as to
prices to be imposed in turn upon distributors. VON BAEL & BELLis, supra note 22, § 5.01 at
5-2.
35. Resale price maintenance agreements are typically entered into between manufacturers
and distributors, whereby the former imposes a system of minimum retail price limits on the
latter. See, e.g., Comm'n Decision, GERO-fabriek, O.J. Eun. Comm. (No. L16) 8 (1977),
[1976-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9914 at 9968-69, discussed infra
text accompanying notes 136-38.
36. Discriminatory pricing has been defined as "applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage." United Brands v. Commission, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8429 at 7666. See generally VON BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 22, § 5.01 at 5-2, § 5.03 at 524.
37. Predatory pricing is generally regarded as the charging of unduly low prices in the
pursuit of eliminating competition. No cases of predatory pricing have been addressed by the
Commission or Court. VON BAEL & BELLis, supra note 22, § 5.01 at 5-3, § 5.04 at 5-39.
38. Excessive pricing has been defined as the charging of prices "which have no reasonable
relation to the economic value of the product supplied." United Brands, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8429 at 7666. While the Court in United Brands stated
that pricing could be determined to be excessive, in part, by comparing a product's selling
price with its cost of production, the Court and Commission have declined to provide specific
criteria for such a determination. Moreover, the Commission has been reluctant to interfere
with enterprises' internal pricing procedures, as in the examination of cost and profit structures,
by establishing itself as a price control authority. VON BAEL & BELLs, supra note 22, § 5.05
at 5-46, n. 9 (citing Fifth Report on Competition Policy, 73, in EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT ON
TBE AcnrvnEs OF TnE COMMUITIES (Comm'n, April 1976).
39. See, e.g. Comm'n Decision, Vimpoltu, O.J. Eui. Comm. (No. L200) 44 (1983), [Jan.
1982-June 1985 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,504
(establishing maximum discount, delivery and payment terms in a horizontal agreement among
Dutch tractor importers violative of Article 85(1)).
40. Id.
41. The issue of profit margins was central to the recent case Stichting Sigarettenindustrie
v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,265 at 16-575, discussed at length infra text accompanying notes 56-121. For
previous Court discussion on this point, see generally FEDETAB v. Commission, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8687
(Belgian tobacco association allocated different profit margins to various groups of wholesalers
and retailers).
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support a violation. 42 Under Article 85, the restraint on competition
must "appreciably" affect trade between member states. 43 Article 86,
in contrast, requires the much more onerous showing of a dominant
position. 44
Resale price maintenance agreements exercised in violation of Article 85 received Commission attention in Deutsche Philips.4 In that
case, Philips, a German sound recording manufacturer, required that
its German retailers sell its products at the prices set by Philips,
regardless of whether the products were obtained in Germany or
from other Member States. 46 The Commission ruled that the resale
price requirement imposed upon imported goods was likely to discourage the importation of potentially less expensive products in
violation of Article 85. 47
In Chiquita,48 by contrast, the Commission applied Article 86 in
response to discriminatory pricing practices by the dominant banana
producer, United Brands. United Brands, the Commission charged,
had abused its dominant position within the banana growing industry
by unjustifiably charging various distributors significantly differing
prices for equivalent transactions. 49 This practice placed distributors
required to pay higher prices at a competitive disadvantage; their
exports to various member states could not compete with the goods
of distributors enjoying lower purchase prices. This practice constituted an abuse of United Brands' dominant position.5 0
B.

New Price Restraint Developments

The Court's recent decisions in Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v.
Commission,51 and Louis Erauw-Jacqueryv. La Hesbignonne SociWtt
Co-optrative2 provide several new insights into price restraint prac-

42. VoN BAEL & BELLiS, supra note 22, § 4.0112] at 4-5.
43. Id.
44. Id. See supra note 27 for a definition of a dominant position.
45. Comm'n Decision, Deutsche Philips, O.J. EtR. Comm. (No. L293) 40 (1973), [Jan.
1973-Dec. 1975 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9606.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 9359-60.
48. Comm'n Decision, Chiquita, O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 95) 1 (1976), [Jan. 1976-Feb.
1978 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9800.
49. Id. at 9788.
50. Id.
51. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265.
52. Louis Erauw-Jacquery v. La Hesbignonne Socit6 Co-opdrative, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. -, 4 Common Mkt. L. Rep 576 (1988).
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tices. In Sigarettenindustrie,the Court upheld a Commission decision
declaring certain direct and indirect restrictive pricing practices invalid

under Article 85. 53 The decision confirmed that even in industries
heavily burdened by Member State regulations, such as tobacco

manufacturing in the Netherlands, sufficient competition exists to
preclude restrictive pricing practices.5 4 In Louis Erauw-Jacquery, the
Court held that vertical resale price maintenance agreements can

escape prohibition- pursuant to Article 85 when the activities are
5
predominantly local in impact.

1. Sigarettenindustrie: The Effect of Burdensome Member State

Regulation on the Validity of Restrictive Pricing Practices
In Sigarettenindustrie6 the Court faced an appeal by a Netherlands
cigarette manufacturing cartel and its members (applicants) 5 7 from a

Commission ruling that the cartel's concerted pricing agreements
were illegal restrictions of competition. The Dutch tobacco industry
is heavily regulated on several different levels.58 The applicants asserted that this regulation destroyed their ability to compete in
particular matters covered by the agreements. 9 Thus, they argued,
no actual competition 6° was possible and the agreements could not
violate Article 85. 61
The Commission responded that the extensive regulation did not
destroy competition in the matters addressed in the agreements. 62

53. See infra text accompanying notes 56-121.
54. Id.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 122-157.
56. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265.
57. The cigarette cartel was organized under Danish law for the purpose of promoting
the common interests of Danish tobacco manufacturers comprising its membership. Sigarettenindustrie, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265 at 16,572. The
cartel, along with six of its members (Philip Morris Holland, Theordorus Niemeyer, R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco, British American Tobacco Company (Nederland), Sigarettenfabriek Ed.
Laurens, and Turmac Tobacco Company) filed separate applications with the Court, pursuant
to Article 173, EEC Treaty, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4635 at 3833, seeking annulment
of a Commission decision holding them in violation of Article 85. Sigarettenindustrieat 16,572.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 71-86.
59. See Sigarettenindustrie [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,265 at 16,585-86.
60. The arguments forwarded by the applicants assumed that Article 85's reference to
restrictions of competition applied only to restrictions on "actual competition," i.e., such level
of competition which would normally exist in the absence of burdensome government restrictions. Id. at 16,592.
61. See Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,265 at 16,573-76.
62. Id. at 16,574.
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Although the Commission conceded that the extensive regulatory
scheme created practical difficulties for the cartel members, the
Commission nevertheless observed that the legislative scheme allowed
adequate room for competition.63 Thus, the Commission defended
its holding that the agreements infringed Article 85(1) and were not
exempt under Article 85(3).64
65
One class of challenged agreements set maximum profit margins
for wholesalers and retailers.66 In addition, the applicants were parties
to agreements increasing retail prices and granting rebates to certain
retailers.6 7 The specific agreements included:
two agreements between the applicants and, respectively, tobacco
wholesalers and retailers setting maximum profit margins for those
distributors; 68
three agreements entered into by SSI members to increase their
retail prices;6 9 and
- a bonus payment agreement, whereby SSI members provided
annual rebates to retailers! 0
The applicants argued that government-imposed price increase limitations and excise duties were the true cause of restricted competition
in the tobacco industry.7 1 Under these laws, retail prices were estab72
lished before the manufacturers sold the products to distributors.
Further, the Dutch laws prevented manufacturers from altering their
prices without prior government approval-and approval was granted

63. Id.
64. Id. at 16,572.
65. "Profit margins" refer to the percentage share of a product's retail price garnered
by a manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer. See id. Profit margins are particularly significant
in industries such as the tobacco industry, where government regulations often impose excise
duties and price restrictions. Such restrictions tend to limit the overall profit margin of a
product.
66. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265 at 16,572.
67. Id.
68. Id. Dutch pricing regulations made it possible to ascertain the retail price of tobacco
products at the time of production. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussion of
Dutch pricing regulations).
69. Sigarettenindustrie, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265 at 16,572.
70. Id.
71. The Dutch legislature imposed a levy on tobacco products based primarily on a high
ad valorem excise duty which taxed products by a percentage of the maximum sales price,
rather than on a fixed-amount per unit sold. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265
at 16,573. In addition, the Dutch Excise Duty Act mandated that tobacco products be sold
only when affixed with a tax stamp indicating the retail selling price. Tobacco could not be
sold at a price higher or lower than that indicated on the tax stamp. Id.
72. Id.
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only on the basis of manufacturing cost increases or decreases. 71
Consequently, the manufacturers argued, they were unable to establish price differences .74 As such, they maintained, their agreements
and concerted practices could not have the effect of restricting
75
competition.
The applicants first cited price increase limitations imposed by the
Dutch government for the purpose of combating inflation. 76 The
restrictions prohibit manufacturers from increasing their sale prices
within a specified period by more than limits mandated by the
government. 77 The regulations provided criteria for the calculation of
price increases, account being taken for increases or reductions in
7
manufacturing costs.
The applicants next referred to Dutch excise laws79 requiring them
to purchase tax stamps from the government bearing the price at
which the product will ultimately be sold. 80 The stamps must be
affixed to all tobacco products prior to distribution and sale.8 ' Once
the tax stamp is affixed by the manufacturer, the price at which the
2
product is sold cannot deviate from the price specified on the stamp.1
Exacerbating these requirements, the applicants argued, is the excise
duty's so-called "compression effect.' '83 The excise duty increases
proportionately to increases in the price of the product. 4 The manufacturers alleged that this graduated excise duty forced them all to
reduce their costs and profits to a minimum, resulting in reduced or
"compressed" price competitiveness in the industry.85 The compression effect, they argued, makes true price competition within the

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 16,574.
Id. at 16,573.
Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [1985-

1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
77.

14,265 at 16,573-74.

Id. at 16,573.

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The Dutch legislature had imposed the duties in line with a Council directive, the aim
of which was to harmonize the fiscal provisions of Member States relating to the consumption
of tobacco products. Id. at 16,583 (Advocate General Opinion). To that end, the Council
directive authorized the levying of proportional or "ad valorem" excise duties, expressed as a
percentage of the maximum retail price, and specific excise duties calculated per product unit.
Id.
81. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,265 at 16,583 (Advocate General
Opinion).
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 16,574-75.
Id. at 16,573.
Id. at 16,574.
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industry "impossible" and, hence, their profit margin agreements
could not be singled out as violative of Article 85(l).86
The Court responded to the applicants' submissions by addressing
the argument of alleged impossible competition in two ways. The
87
Court first examined the argument in the context of retail prices
and then in relation to profit margins. 8
The Court began its discussion of retail price limitations by noting
that the Dutch Prices Order 9 did not require all manufacturers to
increase their product prices in tandem with the annual price increases
authorized by the government. 90
The applicants' position was that the law virtually compelled them
to take advantage of price increase authorizations when granted,
believing that such increases had to be taken at once or else be
forfeited. 91 The Court underscored the Commission view, however,
that price increase authorizations were not subject to a time limit. 92
Consequently, manufacturers were free to progressively increase their
product prices over time. 93 In this manner, manufacturers could
remain competitive vis-a-vis those manufacturers opting to increase
prices by the full amount authorized. 94
In addition, the Court noted that the Dutch excise law did not
prevent manufacturers from freely and independently setting their
retail prices. 95 The excise law requirement that tobacco prices not
vary from the amount indicated on tax stamps applied only to
retailers. 96 Moreover, distinguishing the situation in Van Landewyck
v. Commission,97 the incremental range of tax stamp amounts available to manufacturers was not limited by Dutch tax authorities. 98
86. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265 at 16,574-75.
87. Id. at 16,573-75.
88. Id. at 16,575-77.
89. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussion of Dutch Pricing Act).
90. Sigarettenindustrie, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265 at 16,574.
91. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) 14,265 at 16,575.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 16,574-75.
94. Id.
95. Id.at 16,574.
96. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265 at 16,574.
97. Heintz Van Landewyck v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8687 at 8117. In Van Landewyck the Belgian
tax authorities imposed strict limits on the range of excise tax band (stamp) prices. Id.
98. Sigarettenindustrie, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) 14,265 at 16,574.
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Manufacturers were free to chose a competitive amount to charge'
for a product. 99
Finally, the Court concurred with the Commission's rejection of
the applicants' compression effect argument.0c The Court dismissed
this argument by noting that the compression effect did not force
the costs of all competing manufacturers to the same level.' 0' A
"compressed" industry obliges each manufacturer to reduce its costs,
including its profit margin, to the minimum.'0 Due to variances in
competitors' production costs and profit margin requirements, however, the minimum cost of one manufacturer's product does not
necessarily correspond to that of other manufacturers. 03 The incentive
to fashion competitive product prices is consequently enhanced, not
restricted. Through their concerted price agreements, however, the
Court concluded that, "the applicants eliminated any uncertainty
regarding the prices to be applied by their competitors and were thus
able to escape the compression effect."'' 4
The Court began its treatment of the restrictive profit margin
agreements by noting that, as in the case of competition in retail
prices, the applicants considered the Dutch price and excise legislation
to have rendered competition impossible in establishing dealers' profit
margins. 05 The applicants' view was based on the notion of a
"domino effect" between the allegedly contradictory pricing and
excise legislation.106 The contradiction arises when retailers' profit
margins are increased as, for example, when retailers are granted
discounts or rebates which lower their purchasing prices. Under Dutch
pricing legislation, however, which requires the lowering of selling
prices when dealers' costs decrease, the price of products sold by
retailers enjoying increased profit margins would have to be reduced.'0 Contradicting this requirement is the provision of the Dutch
excise legislation, which, as noted, prohibits reducing (or increasing)
tobacco product prices once tax stamps have been applied. 08 Con99.

Id.

100. Id.
101.

Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. I. Rep. 3831, [1985-

1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

14,265 at 16,575.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,265 at 16,575.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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sequently, the applicants argued that if they were to openly compete
in providing retailers with increased profit margin incentives, the
manufacturers would be party to the retailers' infringement of the
Excise Duty Act. 1' 9
The Commission responded to the applicants' argument by asserting that the domino effect only operates in those sectors of the
economy where retailers retain the authority to set selling prices. In
regulated industries such as tobacco manufacturing, the domino effect
is circumvented by the requirement that benefits offered to retailers,
such as the discounts and rebates granted in several of the applicants'
agreements, be reflected in the initial calculation of product price by
manufacturers.110 Consequently, noted the Commission, when product price increases are authorized by the government, manufacturers
must calculate the percentage of the total profit margin to be offered
to retailers.' Manufacturers are thereby encouraged to offer competitive profit margin percentages to retailers when setting product
prices. 12 In this way, competition in establishing retail profit margins
3
is made possible."
The Court adopted the Commission's views and further supported
them by reasoning: "By entering into agreements setting the margins
of wholesalers and retailers and granting a special rebate to certain
of them, the members of the SSI did collectively what they say they
could not do individually." 1 4 That is, had the SSI members not
concerted on profit margin restrictions as a group, it would have
been in the self-interest of manufacturers to legitimately enter such
agreements on an individual basis.
In concluding, the Court noted that there remained sufficient
margin competition within the industry such that manufacturers could
create price differences between their competing products notwithstanding the government-imposed restrictions.15 Manufacturers could
increase their own profit margin vis-a-vis competitors by reducing or
maintaining their cost levels in relation to those of their competitors." 6 In addition, the regulations did not prohibit the introduction

109.

Id.

110. Id.
111. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission,
1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 16,575-76.
115. Id. at 16,575.
116. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission,
1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [198514,265 at 16,575.

1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [198514,265 at 16,575.
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of new tobacco brands at lower prices. 1 7 Alternatively, authorized
price increases for existing products could be delayed or only partially
applied. 118 The Court's arguments thus supported the conclusion that
price competitiveness remained present in the industry despite the
restrictive effects of Dutch pricing regulation." 9 The concerted price
setting agreements and profit margin agreements entered into by the
applicants, consequently, constituted violations of Community com20
petition policy.
The Sigarettenindustrie case is of particular significance to the
restrictive pricing debate. The case presented the question whether
there exists a point after which competitive forces are so stifled as
to render Article 85 restrictions inapplicable. The Court answered
this question firmly in the negative. Though the Court was willing
to admit that the Dutch government had interfered significantly with
the applicant's price discount and profit margin restraints,'2 1 it could
not find that the interference made competition "impossible." As a
result, even when an industry is heavily burdened by national government regulations as, in this case, through mandated price restrictions and excise duties, the prohibitions of Article 85 apply. The
holding in Sigarettenindustrieshould alert regulated industries that
burdensome Member State regulations are not a justification for
direct or indirect price restraints. Moreover, the Court's rationale
provides continuing support for the proposition that price restraint
practices will almost invariably violate Article 85, even when competitive conditions strictly limit economic freedom as in highly regulated sectors of Member State economies.
2. Erauw-Jacquery: Intrastate Resale Price Maintenance
Agreements Affecting Trade Between Member States
In Louis Erauw-Jacquery,'22 a Belgian holder of patented plant
seeds imposed minimum resale price requirements on its licensees.
The case was referred to the Court by the Tribunal de Commerce at

117. Id. at 16,592 (Advocate General Opinion).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 16,574.
120. Id. at 16,578.
121. Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3831, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,265 at 16,589 (Advocate General
Opinion).
122. Louis Erauw-Jacquery v. La Hesbignonne Socit6 Co-operative, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep.
-, 4 Common Mkt. L. Rep 576 (1988) at 576.
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Liege, Belgium, for a preliminary ruling pursuant to EEC Article
177.23 The Belgian court determined that the price fixing restrictions
limited the availability in Belgium of the patented seeds. 124 It questioned, however, whether such restrictions were incompatible with
EEC Article 85(1) prohibitions on distortions of interstate trade,
based on the absence of a significant effect on trade between Member

States. 125
The case involved an agreement for the propagation of cereal
seeds 126 between Louis Erauw-Jacquery (breeder) and La Hesbignonne
S.C. (licensee), whereby the latter was authorized to propagate 27 and
sell certain cereal stock in Belgium.1 28 A provision in the contract
prohibited the licensee from selling below the minimum selling prices
fixed by the breeder.129 The licensee's failure to comply with the
breeder's minimum resale price restrictions prompted the action first
brought before the Tribunal de Commerce.13 0

123. Id. at 587. Article 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of [the EEC] Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council,
where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member state
[sic], that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on a question is
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
thereon.
EEC Treaty, art. 177, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4655 at 3853.
124. Louis Erauw-Jacquery, 4 Common Mkt. L. Rep 576 (1988) at 588.
125. Id.
126. The seeds at issue were "E3" varieties of "Gerbel multi-row barley." E3 seeds are
used in Belgium almost exclusively by farmers producing cereals for consumption. Id. at 588.
127. "Propagation" refers to "the production, for purposes of commercial marketing of
the reproductive or vegetable... material. . ." Louis Erauw-Jacquery, 4 Common Mkt. L.
Rep 576 (1988) at 580 (citing Nungesser v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015,
[1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8805).
128. Louis Erauw-Jacquery, 4 Common Mkt. L. Rep 576 (1988) at 588.
129. Louis Erauw-Jacquery v. La Hesbignonne Socii6t Co-op6rative, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.
-, 4 Common Mkt. L. Rep 576 (1988) at 579 (Advocate General Opinion). The
J. Rep.
extent of breeder's rights has been defined as:
.. those rights conferred on the breeder of a new plant variety or his successor in
title pursuant to which the production, for purposes of commercial marketing, of
the reproductive or vegetable propagating material, as such, of the new variety and
the offering for sale of marketing of such material are subject to the prior authorisation of the breeder.
Id. at 580 (citing Nungesser v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, [1981-1983
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8805).
In its Louis Erauw-Jacquery decision, the Court has once again expressed its unwillingness
to prohibit "propagating" agreements as violative of Article 85(1) unless they are deemed
unnecessary to protect plant breeders' rights to select propagating licensees. Id. at 589.
130. Id. (Advocate General Opinion) at 581.
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The significant issue addressed by the case is at what point vertical
resale price restraints limited to one Member State appreciably effect
trade between Member States. 131 Prior to the decision in Louis ErauwJacquery, vertical price restraints had been declared violations of
Article 85 where trade between Member States was affected.3 2 The
legality of "purely national" resale price maintenance clauses, however, was unclear. 33
The general Community position regarding purely national restrictive price maintenance systems was articulated in the First Report on
Competition Policy. 34 The Report indicated that "purely national"
systems of resale price maintenance do not generally come under
Community law prohibiting cartels given that trade between Member
States is not affected. 3 The Commission subsequently retreated from
136
this general proposition in GERO-fabriek.
GERO-fabriek involved a resale price maintenance arrangement
imposed upon Dutch and Belgian distributors by a Dutch cutlery
manufacturer. 37 In addition to finding the arrangement to violate
Article 85, the Commission implied that even those resale price
maintenance agreements restricted to single Member States and which
exhibited no explicit horizontal features are prohibited by Article 85
if they involve a substantial market share of the product. 3 ,
In Louis Erauw-Jacquery, the licensee argued that the minimum
resale price requirements imposed upon it by the breeder had the
foreseeable effect of restricting trade between Member States, even
when they only appeared to apply to sales in Belgium. 39 The argument can be established as follows: The breeder had concluded a
substantial number of identically restrictive agreements with other
Belgian propagators. 40 Each propagator, like the licensee, was restricted from selling the seed stock below certain prices or from
exporting without authorization. 4' Since the dealers purchasing the

131. Id. at 584.
132. See VON BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 22, § 5.02[5] at 5-22.
133. Id. at § 5.02[5] at 5-21.
134. See FirstReport on CompetitionPolicy, 55, Fnm GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES
oF TnE Comamrrms, (Comm'n, April 1972).
135. Id. See VoN B.AL & BELLs, supra note 22, § 5.02[5] at 5-22 n. 31.
136. See generally Comm'n Decision, GERO-fabriek, O.J. Eua. Comm. (No. L16) 8 (1977),
[Jan. 1976-Feb. 1978 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9914.
137. Id. at 9914-15.
138. Id. at 9968.
139. Louis Erauw-Jacquery, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -,
4 Common Mkt. L. Rep
576 (1988) at 590.
140. Id. at 581 (Advocate General Opinion).
141. Id. at 585 (Advocate General Opinion).
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grain seed from the propagators could not be similarly restricted,142
export sales were likely to take place nonetheless. 43 However, given
that the artificially-set minimum prices would have been transferred
to the dealer and the prices he subsequently charged, such export
44
sales would be uncompetitive and, hence, discouraged.
The breeder maintained that the license agreement was only intended for sales in Belgium, and that it was unlikely to affect trade
between Member States. 45 In his opinion to the Court, however,
Advocate General Mischio cited prior EEC case law which, he argued,
contradicted the breeder's contention. The Advocate General pointed
to Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission 46 and Groupement des Fabricantsde PapiersPeints de Belgique v. Commission'47
for the proposition that a price-fixing agreement limited to a single
Member State does not preclude the possibility that trade between
Member States is affected. 14s The two cases cited by the Advocate
General, however, involved horizontal agreements between producers. 49 In contrast, the agreement between the breeder and licensee
in Louis Erauw-Jacquery was vertical in nature.
The Court nevertheless concluded that the breeder's system of
identical price-fixing agreements, taken together, constituted the same
type of concerted effect as horizontal price fixing agreements repeatedly held to violate EEC competition rules under the precedent
cases. 50 The agreements restricting the licensee to minimum resale
prices would violate Article 85(1) if trade with other Member States
was "perceptibly" affected.'-'
The question of whether agreements "perceptibly" affect trade
between Member States is for national courts to determine. 52 On

142.
143.

Id.
Id.

144. Louis Erauw-Jacquery, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.

-,

4 Common Mkt. L. Rep

576 (1988) at 585 (Advocate General Opinion).
145. Id. (Judgment) at 590.
146. Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 977;

[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
setting recommended resale prices).

8179 (Dutch cement association

147. Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v. Commission 1975 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1491, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8335 (Belgian
wallpaper association set resale prices and limited rebates).
148. Louis Erauw-Jacquery, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
, 4 Common Mkt. L. Rep

576 (1988) at 584 (Advocate General Opinion).
149.

Id.

150. Id. at 590.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 590-591.
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remand, the national court was to render a decision in accordance
with the "legal and economic context" of the agreement in question.15 3 As specific guidance, the Court cited as influential factors

the presence of a number of similar agreements, the breeder's market
share for the seeds concerned and the licensee's capacity to export
154
the seeds.
The position of the Court in Louis Erauw-Jacquery reflects a
further derogation from the once-accepted proposition that intrastate

restrictive price maintenance agreements do not affect trade between
Member States. The Court articulated this position recently in Salonia

v. Poidomani.155 At issue in the case was an alleged violation of
Article 85 by an agreement regulating the resale of newspapers and

periodicals in Italy. The Salonia decision held that an agreement will
violate Article 85 where it is foreseeable, to a sufficient degree of
probability, that the terms of the agreement will negatively impact
1 56
trade between Member States.

The significance of the Louis Erauw-Jacquerydecision rests on the

Court's finding that vertical price maintenance agreements, even when
executed between enterprises operating solely within one Member

when found
State, will run afoul of Community competition rules
157
to perceptibly affect trade between Member States.
III.

CoMMuNITY LAW GOVERNING THE EXERCISE OF PATENT

RIGHTS

Regulating the exercise of patent rights in the European Community
has proved particularly troublesome for the Commission and Court.
The difficulty lies in the conflict between encouraging technology
transfers while preventing monopolies . 58 Adding to the conflict is

-, 4 Common Mkt. L. Rep
153. Louis Erauw-Jacquery, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
576 (1988) at 590-591.
154. Id. at 590.
155. Salonia v. Poidomani, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1563; [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8758 at 9101.
156. Factors which the Court cited as influencing this determination included whether the
market may employ channels for distribution other than those governed by the agreement and
whether demand for the product is rigid in that it does not vary as a result of the agreement.
Salonia [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8758 at 9101. The Court,
however, declined to suggest the effect of the presence or absence of these factors. Id.
157. Id. at 590-591.
158. See Venit, In the Wake of Windsurfing: Patent Licensing in the Common Market, in
UNITED STATES AND COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST PoLIcIEs 517 (B. Hawk ed. 1987).
Patent licensing, whether between independent firms or within a parent-subsidiary relationship,
provides a means for transferring technology from one enterprise to another. This fosters the

1989 / Review of the European Court of Justice
the overriding Community aim of eliminating artificial barriers to
trade constructed along national borders. 159 Patent licensing and
protection have traditionally been regulated by individual Member
States, 160 often leading to a compartmentalized effect at odds with
the Treaty's vision of an integrated EEC market. These nationally
created rights often permit exclusion of imports. 161 Moreover, national
laws sometimes discriminate between foreign and domestic individuals
seeking access to national markets. 162 The Commission and Court
have responded to these concerns by favoring the Treaty goal of
"the free flow of goods" over individual Member State patent
rules.1 63 In pursuing this goal, the Court has both upheld and
restricted the substantive rights of patent owners under national

law. 164
This section reviews the Court's contribution to the Community
legal regime governing the exercise of patent-based rights. Particular

attention is given to Court decisions concerning attempts to exclude
imports based on patent rights created under national law. The final

part of this section examines the impact of the most recent Court
decision on Community jurisprudence in the field of patent exploitation.

A.

Overview of EEC Patent-BasedRights

Community law governing the exercise of patent rights derives
from Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty. These articles apply

specifically to quantitative restrictions. The issue of quantitative

dissemination of the fruits of technological progress in the marketplace to the benefit of
consumers and businesses. See generally Patent Licensing Regulation, supra note 21 at § 2747.
At the same time, this transfer brings additional resources to bear on generating further
innovations to the underlying technology. On the other hand, restrictive obligations in licensing
agreements, combined with the power to enjoin use of the patented technology, restrict
competition in the market for the patent-based products. Thus, the patent holder's monopoly
subjects the Community to decreased efficiency, technology hoarding and higher prices, all of
which often accompany monopoly power. Id.
159. Venit, supra note 158, at 521. See generally, HAWK, UNrED STATEs, COMMON MARKET
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A CoMarwARxvE GUmE 635-636 (1982).
160. See generally, Jones, Fundamental of InternationalLicensing Agreements and Their
Application in the European Community, 7 INT'L LAW. 78 (1973).
161. For an example of this predicament, see infra text accompanying notes 272-282.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 200-236.
163. Hawk, supra note 159 at 636. See, e.g., Windsurfing Int'l v. Commission, 1986 E.
14,271
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 611, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
(restrictive provisions, including "no challenge" clauses, in patent licensing agreements are
incompatible with Article 85(1)).
164. See infra text accompanying note 236.
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restrictions arises in the context of patent rights when a patent holder
seeks to invoke rights under national law to exclude foreign produced
imports. 165 Although Articles 85 16 and 86167 are relevant to patent
infringement claims' 68 the Court has established its contribution to
Community law concerning patents primarily through the interpretation of the "free movement of goods" provisions of Articles 30

and 36.169

165. See, e.g. Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246; Pharmon v. Hoechst, 1985 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2281, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,206; Merck
v. Stephar and Exler, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8707.
166. Article 85 is relevant to patent arrangements where the freedom of either the licensor
or licensee is restricted to the detriment of competition. The major issue in this area concerns
the permissible scope of patent licenses. The provisions of Article 85(l) may be contravened,
for example, where a patent infringement action is initiated with the aim of distorting
Community competition. It must be shown that the action was brought with "the object, the
means or the consequence" of restricting product availability. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note
17 at 346-347. See, e.g., Cousten and Grundig v. Commission, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
299, [1966 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8046; Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 69, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8101.
However, provision is made under the Patent Licensing Regulation, supra note 21,
2747
at 1955-56, for the exemption of certain restrictive provisions found in patent licensing
agreements between two contracting states when:
1. an obligation is upon the licensor not to license other enterprises, or exploit the patented
product himself, within the licensed territory for the life of the patent;
2. an obligation is upon the licensee not to exploit the patented product in territories reserved
for the licensor under parallel patents;
3. an obligation is upon the licensee not to either manufacture, advertise, or actively market
the patented product in territories licenced to other licensees under parallel patents;
4. an obligation is upon the licensee to use only the licensor's trade mark to distinguish the
licensed product, provided the licensee can still identify herself as the manufacturer.
Patent Licensing Regulation, supra note 21, art. 1 (1),
2747A at 1955-56.
167. A violation of Article 86 may be found where a patent holder initiates an infringement
action with the aim of maintaining its "power to impede... effective competition over a
considerable part of [its] relevant market." VoN BAEL & BELus, supra note 22, § 9.03[l] at
9-17 (citing Sirena, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8101). The
exercise of patent rights does not in and of itself constitute an abuse of dominant position
however, given that such rights inherently possess, at least initially, a certain character of
monopoly. VON BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 22, § 9.03[1] at 9-17.
In order for a patent infringement claim to be prohibited under Article 86, it must be
established that (i) the claimant enjoys a dominant position in the market of its product; (ii)
the dominant position is being abused in a manner likely to adversely affect trade between
member states; and, most importantly, (iii) there is a relevant connection between the property
infringement claimed and the abuse of dominant position alleged. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra
note 17 at § 7-055, 349.
168. For an analysis of the latest United States Supreme Court decision addressing the
exclusion of imports under national law see generally Note, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.:
Attention Gray Market Shoppers, the United States Supreme Court has Saved Your Bargain
Prices, 2 TSANsNAT'L LAW. 303 (1989).
169. See, e.g. Deutsche Grammophone v. Metro, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, [19711973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8106; Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm,
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
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Restrictions on the movement of goods between Member States
are strictly prohibited under the authority of EEC Treaty Article 30:
"Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equiv' 1 70
alent effect shall ... be prohibited between Member States.
Article 36, however, allows for prohibitions on imports or exports
when "justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or
public security; ... or the protection of industrial and commercial
property."' 7' Regarding patent rights, the Court has consistently held
that Article 36 allows exclusion of imports "only insofar as [it is]
justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the
specific subject matter of that property.'

1

72

The Court's contribution

to Community law relating to patents focuses on the definition of
these rights.
In the leading case of Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 73 the Court
addressed the issue of parallel patent licensing' 74 in the context of
pharmaceutical products. The Court held that Articles 30 and 36

8466; Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246; Pharmon v. Hoechst, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2281,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,206. See generally Hawk, supra
note 159, at 636-37.
170. EEC Treaty, art. 30, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 322 at 451.
171. Article 36 provides that:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public
policy or public security; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
EEC Treaty, art. 36, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 352 at 475.
-,
[1986-1988
172. Allen and Hanburys v. Generics, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,169 [hereinafter Generics]. The
Court has defined "specific subject matter" rights as ". . .the control by the [patent] owner
... of the manufacture and first marketing of the protected products," Nungesser and Kurt
Eisele v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 2015, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8805 at 7529. See also Merck v. Stephar and Exler 1981 E. Comm. Ct.
J.Rep. 2063. [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8707. For an expanded
discussion of specific subject matter rights, see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
173. Centrafarn v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246.
174. The term "parallel patent licensing" or "parallel licensing" typically refers to the
granting of exclusive licenses for the marketing of the same product to two or more parties
in different countries Jones, supra note 160, at 94-95. In Centrafarm, Sterling Drug held
patents in both Great Britain and the Netherlands on the preparation of the pharmaceutical
product trade named "Negram." The patents were licensed in the two countries by two separate
subsidiaries of Sterling Drug. Centrafarm purchased the drug in Britain, where the cost was
substantially lower than in the Netherlands, and imported it into the Netherlands. Sterling
Drug subsequently filed a patent infringement claim against Centrafarm. Centrafarm, [1974
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246 at 9151-46.
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preclude a patent proprietor 175 from preventing the importation of

the patented drug from another Member State when the drug was
marketed in the that Member State by the proprietor or with her
consent. 176 The Centrafarm decision relied on the principle of "exhaustion of rights' 177 as a limitation on the exercise of patent rights
to protect markets.178 Under this principle, patent proprietors enjoy
protection in the development and initial marketing of the patented
product. 79 Once the product is marketed anywhere in the Common
Market by the proprietor or with her consent, the proprietor exhausts
the right to prevent the free circulation of the product by others.8 0
The "exhaustion of rights" principle attempts to balance the
protection of a patent holder's investment under national law with
the Community aim of promoting the free flow of goods.' 8 ' As
previously mentioned, Article 36 has been interpreted to allow for
derogation from the free movement of goods provisions where the
invocation of patent flows from the "specific subject matter of the
property.' 1 82 This latter notion has been narrowly defined to encompass:
.. the guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of
the inventor, has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view
to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licenses
8 3
to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.

In other words, territorial exclusivity is protected only insofar as it
is required to safeguard the patentee's initial development and mar-

175. As used in this article, the term "patent proprietor" refers to the individual or entity
vested with the original patent rights to a product.
176. Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246 at 9151-56.
177. The "exhaustion of rights" principle was first introduced by the Court in regard to
the copyright of sound recordings. Deutsche Grammophone v. Metro, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 487, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8106 at 7193 (prohibiting
a copyright owner from excluding sale of imports distributed by the owner or with the owner's
consent pursuant to the owner's exclusive right under national law).
178. Centrafarm [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246 at 9151-55 to
9151-56.
179. See id.
180. BELLAmY & CHiLD, supra note 17 at 330; see also Centrafarm, [1974 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246 at 9151-55 to 9151-56.
181. See Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8246 at 9151-55 (discussing need to reconcile the
Community's ban on quantitative restrictions with the exclusive rights of industrial property
owner).
182. Id.at 9151-55 to 9151-56.
183. Id.
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keting investment, while protection against infringement is preserved
to its full extent under national law. 184 The result is a Communityimposed limitation on patent rights created by national law.
The Court subsequently expanded the exhaustion principle to include cases involving products imported from Member States where
patents are not available. In Merck v. Stephar185 a Dutch patent
proprietor (Merck) sought to enjoin the importation of the hypertension drug "Moduretic" into the Netherlands from Italy, though
Merck had previously marketed the drug in Italy. Since Italian patent
law did not allow for the patenting of pharmaceutical products when
Merck first introduced Moduretic into the market,' Merck was
unable to obtain an Italian patent for Moduretic. 187 The drug importing firm Stephar subsequently imported the drug into the Netherlands from Italy, selling it at prices lower than those charged by
Merck.
In support of an infringement claim, Merck attempted to distinguish the earlier Centrafarm case, which had premised the exhaustion
of rights on the patentee having already enjoyed the fruits of initial
marketing.'8 8 Merck and those supporting the claim"8 argued that
the inability to obtain a patent in Italy had prevented Merck from
"enjoy[ing] a monopoly in first placing the product on the market.," '0
The Court rejected this contention. Although the Court reasoned
that protecting the "specific purpose of the product" would normally
allow the patentee to enjoy the rewards of an initial marketing
monopoly, such protection did not guarantee that a reward on
investment would follow in all circumstances. 19' As such, it was up

184. Id.
185. Merck v. Stephar and Exler, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063. [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8707.
186. Merck, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8707 at 8454-55.
The provision of Italian law was declared unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court
on March 20, 1978. Consequently, it is has since become possible to obtain patents for drugs
in Italy. Id.
187. Even though the Italian decree concerning non-patentability of pharmaceutical products
was held unconstitutional (see supra note 186) prior to Merck's claim, Merck was still unable
to obtain a patent for the drug in Italy given that the product "no longer fulfilled the legal
condition of novelty." Merck, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8707
at 8446.
188. Id. at 8455.
189. The governments of France and the United Kingdom submitted arguments in support
of Merck's position. Id. at 8450-51.
190. Merck v. Stephar and-Exler, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063. [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8707 at 8455.

191.

Id.
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to the proprietor of the patent to determine the profitability of
marketing the product, including potential dangers of distributing in
Member States where patents were not available./92 The decision in
Merck further constricted the protection available to a patentee from
competing imports. In so doing, the Court, as in Centrafarm, limited
the patent holders' substantive rights existing under national law.
Articles 30 and 36 were once again invoked by the Court in the
Pharmon v. Hoechst 93 decision, this time regarding the importation
of patented goods produced under a compulsory license. 94 The
importer (Pharmon) purchased a consignment of goods from the
holder of a compulsory licence for distribution of the goods in the
Netherlands. 19 The U.K. Patents Act provided for the compulsory
licensing of foodstuffs, medicines, and surgical instruments to ensure
their availability to the public at lowest possible prices. 96 The Court
held that the owner (Hoechst) of parallel drug patents in the Netherlands and United Kingdom could invoke Dutch law to prevent the
importation of the drug into the Netherlands by Pharmon. 97
The Court found that Hoechst could not have consented to the
marketing of its product by Pharmon, since Hoechst was not a
signatory to the license. 9 ' Using the reasoning of Merck, the Court
concluded that Hoechst would be denied the "reward of his creative
effort" if he were not allowed to prevent marketing by the third
party under a compulsory license to which he had not consented. 99

192. Id. at 8455.
193. Pharmon v. Hoechst, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2281, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,206.
194. Compulsory licenses are licenses granted to third parties by a national government to
produce and market a patented product in cases where the original patent holder has enjoyed

rights to the product for some time (usually a minimum of three years) and where the third
party is unable to obtain a license from the patent holder under reasonable terms. The grounds
for granting a compulsory license may include:
the patented product not being marketed in the country to the greatest extent reasonably
possible;

-

the demand for the product not being met; and

- the proprietor of a patented product refuses to grant a license to third parties on reasonable
grounds.
U.K. Patents Act 1977, Sect. 48, § PA77-048, reprinted in T. WHITE, J. JEass, R. JACOB, &
W. CORNISH, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED KINGDOM AND EuRoPEAN PATENT LAW 2044-2045
(1977, supp. 1983).
195. Pharmon [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,206 at 16,254.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 16,257.
198. Pharmon v. Hoechst, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2281, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,206 at 16,256-16,257.
199. Id. at 16,257. The Court ruled, moreover, that:
.. it makes no difference whether a prohibition on exportation is attached to the
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Thus, departing from the practice of limiting rights under national
legislation established in Merck and Centrafarm, the Court allowed
the patent owner to fully exploit its patent-based rights under national
law.
B.

Patents and Licenses of Right

The recent case of Allen and Hanburys v. Generics ° is the latest
development of significance in Community patent case law. The case
introduces the issue of "licenses of right" to the patent-based rights
case law of Centrafarm, Merck and Pharmon. In Generics, Allen
and Hanburys (Hanburys), a United Kingdom pharmaceutical company, holding a U.K. patent on the drug "Salbutamol, ' ' 20 sought to
enjoin Generics, a distributor of generic drugs in the U.K., from
importing the drug from Italy. 2°2 Hanburys was one of several
subsidiaries of Glaxo Holding PLC, whose member companies together owned parallel patents2 3 for Salbutamol in several Member
States in which it was marketed. 204 At the time of its development,
however, the drug was not capable of being patented in Italy, again
due to the unavailability of such pharmaceutical patents under Italian
205
law.
The U.K. patent rights held by Hanburys, and under which it
claimed infringement, arose under a patent endorsed "license of
right." 2°6 Under the "license of right" provisions of U.K. patent
law, patents having a remaining term of five years or more are
20 7
endorsed "licenses of right" for the last four years of their term.

compulsory license, whether that license fixes royalties payable to the patentee or
whether the patentee has accepted or refused such royalties.
Id.
, [1986-1988
200. Allen and Hanburys v. Generics, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9 14,446 at 18,169.
201. The drug, trade named "Ventolin," is used in the treatment of asthma. Id. at 18,159.
202. Id. at 18,159.
203. For a definition of parallel patents, see supra note 174.
[1986-1988
-,
204. Allen and Hanburys v. Generics, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,159.
205. For an explanation of the inability to obtain certain patents in Italy, see supra notes
186-88 and accompanying text.
206. Generics, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,159.
207. Id. at 18,158 (citing United Kingdom Patents Act 1977). The "licenses of right"
provision was enacted into British law in 1978 as a consequence of new patent rules ratified
in the Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (Community Patent
Convention (CPC)), 19 O.J. Etu. Comm. (No. L17) 1 (1976), 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
11 5795-5824D at 4717-4722. Under the terms of the Convention, the duration of European
patents was set at twenty years. CPC, Art. 51, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) I 5806B at 4717-
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The "license of right" provision allows any person to market patented

products when such marketing would otherwise violate the original
8

20
patentee's patent rights.
An important clause in the license of right provisions distinguishes
between license applicants who produce the patented product in the
U.K and those who intend to import the product from other Member

States. 209 Whereas the domestic producer is assured a license if he
accepts the terms fixed by the Comptroller, the importer may be

enjoined from importing the product even if he accepts the license
terms. 210 Consequently, the proprietor of an endorsed patent is entitled to challenge the granting of a license to a third party who

intends to import the product, but cannot oppose a license for
someone manufacturing and marketing the product in the same
21
Member State. '

Generics had negotiated with Hanburys for a license to import
Salbutamol from Italy to the U.K. After failing to reach an agreement, Generics applied directly to the Comptroller of Patents to

settle terms of a license under the "licenses of right" provisions of
the Patents Act. 21 2 Before the Comptroller acted on the application,
however, Generics informed Hanburys of its intent to import the

drug. 213 Hanburys considered this conduct a threat of patent infringement and instituted an action for an injunction which ultimately
reached the House of Lords. 21 4

19 (citing Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Art.
63, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 5567 at 4637). British patents previously had been issued
for a term of sixteen years. Generics, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,446 at 18,158.
208. The granting of a license of right, though not transferring any proprietary interests
in the patented product, simply "makes lawful an action that would otherwise be contrary to
the patentee's rights." U.K. Patents Act 1977, Section 46(3), reprintedin Generics, [1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,159. Upon the entering of such
license rights, "any person shall... be entitled as of right to a license under the patent on
such terms as may be settled by agreement or, in default of agreement, by the... [Comptroller
General of Patents] .... " Generics at 18,159.
209. Allen and Hanburys v. Generics, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -,
[1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,159.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 18,167-168.
212. Id. at 18,159.
213. Id.
214. Allen and Hanburys v. Generics, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. , [1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,159. The case was subsequently
referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling pursuant to EEC Article 177, 3 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 4655 at 3853. Id. at 18,159-18,160.
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The major question referred to the Court by the House of Lords 2 5
was whether the unequal treatment between domestic producers and
importers under the provisions of licenses of right ran contrary to
the free movement of goods provisions of Articles 30 and 36 of the
EEC Treaty. 216 In addressing the issue, the Court recalled its findings
in Merck,217 in which the Court had held that derogations from
Article 30 prohibitions could only be justified insofar as necessary
to safeguard those rights which constitute the specific subject matter
of the property. 218 The Court acknowledged that unlike the proprietor
of an ordinary patent, the proprietor of a patent endorsed "license
of right" cannot enjoin the granting of a license to an applicant
seeking to manufacture and market the patented product in the
licensed territory. 219 Despite this restriction, however, the Court stated
that Article 36 allows the patent proprietor a fair return on her
product. 220 This return includes the recovery of product development
costs and the fruits of initial marketing. 22 This right, however, cannot
exceed the Article 36 limitation to rights protecting the specific subject
matter of the property. 222 If the test for determining the "subject
matter" rights protected under endorsed patents is the "fair return"
principle, concluded the Court, then the same test applied to domestic
licensees of right should also apply to alleged infringements by
=3
importing licensees.
The Court reasoned that the importation of the drug by Generics
could only be prohibited if necessary to ensure the patent holder the
same rights against the importer as he would enjoy against a local
producer of the drug.
In the absence of such a showing, "an
injunction issued against an importer-infringer ... would constitute
arbitrary discrimination prohibited by Article 36 of the Treaty and
could not be justified on the grounds of the protection of industrial
and commercial property." ' 5
215. The action was referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 177.
See supra note 123.
216. Generics, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,168.
217. Merck v. Stephar and Exler, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063, [1979-1981 Transfer

Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
218.

8707. See also notes 185-92 and accompanying text.

Generics, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

219. Allen and Hanburys v. Generics, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

14,446 at 18,169.

-,

[1986-1988

14,446 at 18,169.

220. Id. at 18,169.
221. Id. at 18,169-18,170.
222. See supra notes 174-99 and accompanying text.
223. Generics, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,169.
224. Allen and Hanburys v. Generics, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
-,
[1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,446 at 18,169.
225. Id. at 18,170.
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Two arguments were forwarded by Hanburys in support of its
claim for injunctive relief. The first maintained that injunctions
prohibiting imports can be justified on the basis of the difficulty in
ascertaining the quantity and quality of products produced in other
Member States. 226 This situation, Hanburys argued, made the calculation of royalties much more difficult than for domestically produced
goods. 227 The Court quickly dismissed this argument, however, noting
that it might well be just as difficult to make royalty determinations
for domestic products. 228 Moreover, such determinations must be set
out in the original licensing agreement whether for domestic producers
229
or importers.
The second major argument pressed by Hanburys concerned the
need for quality control of imported pharmaceutical products in the
interests of public health. 2 0 Here too, the Court rejected Hanburys'
contention, stating that the protection of a patentee's exclusive rights
cannot be masked behind unrelated concerns over public health. 2a'
Though not specifically citing its prior case law, the Court's dismissal
of the public health argument falls in line with its earlier decision in
Centrafarm.232 In that case, the Court established that the owner of
a pharmaceutical patent cannot avoid the prohibitions of Articles 30
and 36 for the purpose of protecting the public from the distribution
of potentially defective drugs 3 The Court in Centrafarm did acknowledge that protecting the public from such defects is a "legitimate concern" and capable of being addressed under the exception
of Article 36 concerning the protection of health and life of humans
and animals? 4 The Court noted, however, that such protective
measures are limited to those adopted in the field of health control
235
and, as in Generics, ruled the public health argument invalid.
The Generics decision, in sum, provides a further restriction by
the Court on the permissible scope of patent-based rights, particularly
those which discriminate against importers. Prior to Generics, the

226.

Id. at 18,169.

227.

Id.

228. Id.
229. Allen and Hanburys v. Generics, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.

Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
230.
231.
232.
Binder]
233.
234.
235.

-

, [1986-1988

14,446 at 18,169.

Id.
Id. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (public health provision of Article 36).
See Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246 at 9151-57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Court restricted in some cases and upheld in others various provisions
of national law permitting exclusion of imports based on nationallyerected patent rights. Based on the principle of exhaustion of rights,
the Court protects the patent proprietor's substantive right to a
monopoly in the initial distribution of patented products. Court
jurisprudence, however, prevents exclusion of imports purchased
abroad and redistributed by third parties in the patentee's or licensee's
protected territory.2 6 The Centrafarm decision precludes patent proprietors from enjoining third parties who purchase the patented
products from licensees abroad from importing such products. In
Merck, the Court reaffirmed the invalidity of national laws precluding
such parallel imports.
The Generics decision adds to Community law regarding national
laws creating hybrid substantive patent rights, such as compulsory
licenses and licenses of right. Under Pharmon, the patent holder or
its licensees may invoke national law to preserve national rights
protecting the initial distribution in protected territories against imports by third parties holding involuntary licenses. Now, following
the precedent established in Merck, the Court has chosen to further
restrict the scope of national patent-based rights. Under Generics,
national laws may not unjustifiably discriminate against third party
importers with regard to hybrid patent rights such as licenses of
right. Though regulating the scope of patent rights will undoubtedly
continue to prove difficult for the Court, it seems evident from the
progression of its cases to date that the overriding aim of eliminating
the artificial barriers to Community trade will weigh heavily in its
deliberations.
IV.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF EEC COMPETITION
REGULATIONS

Articles 85 and 86, which prohibit restraints of competition taking
place "within the common market" and affecting trade "between
Member States,"1237 seem limited geographically by their language to
those states within the Community itself. Jurisdiction over anticompetitive practices has not, however, been restricted to transactions

236. See generally Note, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.: Attention Gray Market Shoppers,
the United States Supreme Court has Saved Your Bargain Prices, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 303

(1989).
237. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of Articles 85
and 86).
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which strictly involve EEC member states. In several significant cases,

the Court imposed liability for various competition infringements on
enterprises located in non-EEC countries. 238 However, the exercise of

jurisdiction over transactions involving foreign-based enterprises by
EEC institutions has proved theoretically troubling for the Court, as
239
it has for other countries.

The issue of the scope of EEC extraterritorial jurisdiction was
originally presented in the landmark "Dyestuffs"

cases. 24° In these

cases, the Commission asserted jurisdiction over nine European manufacturers of dyestuff,241 including four non-Member State companies, 2A2 alleging concerted pricing-fixing 23 in violation of Article 85.24
The Commission maintained that jurisdiction was valid on the basis
of the anti-competitive "effects"

within the Common Market as a

result of the foreign enterprises' price-fixing scheme. 245 The "effects
doctrine" embodies the right of a nation to extend its jurisdiction

238. See, e.g. Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171 (applying Articles
85 and 86 to non-EEC defendants); Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano & Commercial Solvents
v. Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8209 (Article 86 applies to commercial and industrial activities supplying the Member
States); Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161 (imputing liability on foreign
parent through EEC subsidiary) [hereinafter Dyestuffs].
239. For the Court's discussion of the various international law theories of extraterritorial
jurisdiction see infra notes 269-90 and accompanying text. For an analysis of current issues in
extraterritorial jurisdiction see Comment, ExtraterritorialApplication of Securities Regulations:
Territorialismin the Wake of the October 1987 Market Crash, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 307 (1988).
240. Dyestuffs, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161; J.R. Geigy
v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 787, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH)
8164; Sandoz v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 845, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8165.
241. Dyestuff refers to all products relating to aniline dyes and pigments. See Dyestuffs,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8161 at 8032-33 (Opinion of
Advocate General).
242. Imperial Chemical Industries was registered in the United Kingdom (which, at the
time of the decision, was not a member of the EEC). Ciba, Geigy and Sandoz were based in
Switzerland. Dyestuffs, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8161 at
8049 (Advocate General Opinion).
243. For a definition and discussion of price fixing, see supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
244. For a discussion concerning the particular pricing infringements of the Dyestuffs
companies, see infra note 260. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8161 at
8003-04; Geigy, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8164 at 8111-13;
Sandoz, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8165 at 8146-48.
245. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8161 at 8007; Geigy, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8164 at 8114-15; Sandoz, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8165 at 8150.
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to acts arising outside its territory which impact conditions within
its territory. 246
Arguing for one of the foreign companies in their appeal before
the Court, Professor Jennings refuted the effects doctrine as an
invalid infringement of public international law. 2 7 He contended that
EEC jurisdiction over competition infringements should be confined
to traditional "territorial" limits, 241 and should not extend to nonMember State enterprises only for their conduct within the EEC.249
Advocate General Mayras, on the other hand, proposed a "modified"
effects test.250 Under this view, jurisdiction over foreign restrictive
conduct is valid only when its effects are "direct and immediate,"
"reasonably foreseeable" and "substantial. 25
1
In upholding the Commission decision, however, the Court relied
on its own, narrower basis of jurisdiction. 252 Its theory was premised
primarily on an "economic unity" concept of jurisdiction, which
imposed liability by imputing the prohibited actions of foreign enterprises to the EEC-based subsidiaries executing them. 253 The rationale of the Dyestuffs decision was limited in its applicability because
the presence of EEC-based subsidiaries obviated the need to develop
a jurisdictional doctrine reaching beyond traditional territorial theory.
The Court, thus, was not required to elaborate on the permissible
scope of jurisdiction over non-EEC entities whose extraneous actions

246.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THID) oF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
§§ 402, 403 (1987) and comments thereto. Hawk defines the "effects doctrine" as "the
most extreme articulation of extraterritorial application... under which a state applies its laws
to conduct by non-nationals occurring entirely outside its territory but which has some effect
within the prescribing state." Hawk, supra note 159 at 21.
247. Dyestuffs, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161 at 8005.
"Public international law governs the relation between sovereign states and may perhaps be
regarded as the common law of mankind in an early stage of development (footnote omitted)."
P.M. NORTH, PRiVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (9th ed. 1974).
248. The "territorial" principle of jurisdiction is rooted in the notion that a state is
conferred sovereign dominion over persons and goods situated within the physical territory of
the state. See HiNao, un, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-19 (1984); RESTATEMENT (THRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Subchapter A, Introductory Note, at 235,
and § 402, at 237-38 (1987).
249. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161 at 8006.
250. Id. at 8053-58 (Advocate General Opinion).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 8031.
253. The economic unity doctrine (or "unity of group" theory) comprises three ideas:
extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign enterprises, imputation of substantive liability to foreign
enterprises for conduct of local subsidiaries, and location of concerted action between related
enterprises for purposes of EEC and U.S. anti-trust rules. Hawk, supra note 159, at 457; See
also VON BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 22, § 1.03 at 1-7 (discussing the unity of group theory
in the EEC).
STATES
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produced effects within the Community, but which were not linked
to EEC-based agents.
The jurisdictional debate of Dyestuffs provides the backdrop to

the Court's recent judgment in the "Woodpulp" cases. 254 The cases

center around a Commission challenge to the concerted price-fixing

practices of numerous woodpul2 2 5 producers located in Scandinavia,
North America, Spain and Portugal.2 6 The Court upheld the Commission decision finding EEC jurisdiction over enterprises operating
257

outside the Community which affected competition within the EEC.
The Commission recognized the novelty of the Woodpulp cases
28
for EEC competition jurisdiction at the outset of its decision. It
noted that the joined cases represented the first instance of alleged

competition violations by enterprises all having their headquarters
outside the Community. 259 The producers and their trade associations
were found to have restricted price competition and hindered trade
between Member States of the EEC by:
concerting to fix prices announced and charged in the EEC for
the sale of woodpulp to customers located in that market;
- exchanging information among themselves on prices to be charged
on a regional and international level; and

254. Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85: (A. Ahlstr6m, Joutseno-Pulp,
and Others (Case 89/85); Bowater Incorporated (Case 104/85); The Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Export Association (Case 114/85); St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp and Paper Company Limited
(Case 116/85); International Pulp Sales Company (Case 117/85); Westar Timber Limited (Case
125/85); Welwood of Canada Limited (Case 126/85); MacMillan Bloedel Limited (Case 127/
85); Canadian Forest Products Limited (Canfor) (Case 128/85); and British Columbia Forest
Products Limited (Case 129/85) v. Commission [hereinafter Woodpulp], 1988 E. Comm. Ct.
-, 4 C.M.L.R. 901. See, EC Jurisdiction over Foreign Companies Upheld by
J. Rep.
Court, Fin. Times, Sept. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 3; Ruling Widens Reach of EC Rules on
Competition, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1988, at 20, col. 1.
255. Woodpulp is the primary material used in the manufacture of paper and paperboard.
At issue in the present cases was the sale of "bleached sulphate woodpulp," the highest quality
woodpulp, to some of the 800 paper manufacturers in the EEC. Little of the high grade pulp
is produced in the EEC, accounting for the fact that the EEC is the most important market
for foreign producers. Woodpulp, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 at 906.
256. At the time of the Commission decision in 1984, Portugal and Spain were not members
of the EEC. Both nations will become Member States of the EEC in 1992. See Treaty
Concerning the Accession to the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the
European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, 28 O.J.
7703-7733D (1988).
EuR. Comm. (No. L302) 1 (1985), 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
257. Woodpulp, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 at 942.
258. Comm'n Decision, Woodpulp, 28 O.J. EuR. Comit. (No. L 85) 1 (1985), [Jan. 198210,654, at
June 1985 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
11,547-10. Comm'n Press Release, No. IP (84) 468, Brussels, Dec. 20, 1984, [Jan. 1982-June
1985 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,654, at 11,547-10.
259. Comm'n Decision, Woodpulp, at 11,547-10.
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- prohibiting the resale or export within the EEC of woodpulp
sold to European customers.m

The decision declared the woodpulp producers and associations in
violation of Article 85 and imposed fines.61 The producers then
appealed to the Court of Justice for annulment of the Commission
decision, specifically challenging the extraterritorial application of
262
Community jurisdiction.
Once before the Court, the woodpulp producers contended that
the Commission Woodpulp decision misinterpreted the territorial
scope of Article 85.263 Distinguishing the earlier decision in the
Dyestuffs cases, the producers noted that the Court had extended
jurisdiction over non-EEC domiciled companies only insofar as the
foreign companies controlled the actions of their subsidiaries within
the EEC. 264 In Dyestuffs, the Court had specifically refused to adopt
the "effects doctrine" of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 265 Thus, in the
Dyestuffs cases, responsibility for price manipulation was imputed
to the subsidiary located within the EEC, not because price fixing
effects were felt in the EEC, but because the Court considered the
responsible companies "alter egos" of EEC-registered undertak-

260. Id. at 11,547-24, 11,547-32. The price fixing practices were found to have affected
60% of the bleached sulphate woodpulp market in the EEC. Id. at 11,547-33.
.. the effect of the agreements and practices on prices announced and/or charged
to customers and on resale of pulp within the EEC was therefore not only substantial
but intended, and was the primary and direct result of the agreements and practices.
Id. at 11,547-23 to 11,547-24.
261. Id. at 11,547-34 to 11,548. The fines imposed ranged from 50,000 ECU to 250,000
ECU (approximately $58,000 to $290,000 at current rates of exchange), depending on the
individual producer's length and the seriousness of Article 85 violation:
In determining the fine on the individual firms to which this decision is addressed,
the Commission has taken into consideration the role played by them in the concerting
pricing practices and in the exchange of information, the length of time they are
proved to have taken part in the infringements, their respective average shipments
of bleached sulphate wood pulp to the Community in the last year of the period
under review and-to a lesser extent-the individual total turnover of each.
Id. at 11,547-34.
In its Press Release accompanying the decision, the Commission stated "that this case will
guarantee that the pulp market in the EEC will now function competitively and that, with this
decision as an example, the risk of concertation on prices in similar markets in the EEC will
be substantially lessened. Id. at 11,547-10.
262. Woodpulp, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 at 939.
263. Id.
264.

Id.

265. Id. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in
Dyestuffs). However, as Advocate General Darmon points out in his "Woodpulp" opinion,
"Although the Court has not, in its decisions to date, formally upheld the effects doctrine
with regard to the application of competition law to undertakings outside the Community,
that does not imply that it rejects the doctrine." Id. 918-19.
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ings. 266 The woodpulp companies argued that because their actions
took place outside of the EEC, some of them without the involvement
of subsidiaries or agents registered in the EEC, jurisdiction based on
267
alleged Article 85 violations was without support.

The producers further argued that the exertion of jurisdiction by
EEC institutions would violate well-recognized principles of public
international law and comity. 26s American woodpulp producers contended, for example, that applying Article 85 to them contradicted
the intent of the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 which aimed to
promote U.S. exports by exempting export associations from U.S.
antitrust regulations. 269 Such a contradiction, they maintained, constituted a breach of the principle of non-interference recognized by
international law. 270 Likewise, the Canadian producers considered the
imposition of fines by the EEC, and the conditioning of their
reduction on specified action, an infringement of Canada's sovereignty and thus a breach of the principle of international comity. 271
The Court dismissed the argument that application of EEC law
was an infringement of the principle of non-interference 27 2 by pointing
out that no contradiction existed for American producers between
EEC competition law and the Webb-Pomerene Act.- The Court
stated that the Act merely exempts export cartels from the application

266. See supra notes 252-53 (discussing the Court's holding in Dyestuffs). The conduct of
a subsidiary can be imputed to its parent company, according to the Court, where the
subsidiary, although having separate legal personality, does not decide independently upon its
own market behavior, but essentially follows the instructions given to it by the parent company.
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619, [19711973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161 at 8031.
267. Woodpulp, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
-, 4 C.M.L.R. at 939 (Advocate General
Opinion).
268. Id. at 940.
269. Id. The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 exempted export associations, such as the Pulp,
Paper and Paperboard Export Association (formerly named Kraft Export Association), from
United States anti-trust laws. Id. at 906.
270. Id. at 940.
271. Id. The principle of international comity includes the notion that nations will mutually
recognize and respect the sovereign prerogatives with which independent states have historically
been endowed. Where one state requires that certain action be taken by nationals of another
state, this principle of comity may be jeopardized. See RESTATMENta,
supra note 246, § 403,
Comment (a), at 245-6.
272. The principle of noninterference recognizes situations where a person or enterprise is
bound by the contradictory laws or regulations of two states having concurrent jurisdiction in
the matter. These situations typically arise in the case of enterprises which are organized under
the laws of one state, but do business in another state. Where conflicting laws exist between
states, the principle of noninterference obliges each state to exercise its jurisdiction with
moderation. Woodpulp, 4 C.M.L.R. at 941. See also RESTATEENT, supra note 246, § 403(3),
at 245.
273. Woodpulp, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep._,
4 C.M.L.R. at 942.
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of United States antitrust laws-it does not require that such cartels
be formed. 274 Only if such a requirement were present would prod-

ucers have been faced with conflicting state regulations, whereby the
principle of non-interference would come into question. 275
The Court also dismissed the breach of comity argument in summary fashion. 276 The argument, maintained the Court, presupposed
the invalidity of the EEC's extraterritorial application of competition
rules, in the form applied in Woodpulp.277 The Court declared the
comity issue moot, because the Court held the extraterritorial jurisdiction valid. 278
The Court's concern for establishing the appropriate basis for
applying extraterritorial jurisdiction is clearly evident in its judgment.
Notably, in the section of the Court's report entitled "Questions
asked by the Court," the Court articulated only one specific question:
Does the Commission maintain that it has jurisdiction in these cases
by reason of conduct which has taken place within the Community
and, if so, what is that conduct? Or does it base its jurisdiction on
the effects within the Community of conduct which took place
outside the Community and, if so, what is that conduct and what
are its effects? 279
Providing the language which the Court subsequently adopted in its
judgment, the Commission responded that "what is important from
the point of view of jurisdiction is where the conduct of the parties
which it is the object, or effect, of the agreement to influence
occurred and not the place where the agreement was made."28°
Applying this test to the present case, the conduct of the woodpulp
producers which violated Article 85 did take place in the EEC: the
fixed prices were communicated to purchasers in the EEC and the
prices were subsequently charged within the EEC. 281

274. Id.
275. Id. at 942-43.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Woodpulp, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, 4 C.M.L.R. at 942-3.
279. Id. at 914 (Report for the Hearing).
280. Id. Two other considerations were emphasized by the Commission: First, "conduct"
can consist of conduct initiated by principals as well as that of their subsidiaries, agents, and
other controlled entities. (Such a view is clearly consistent with the Court's holding in
"Dyestuffs.") Second, it is necessary to comprehensively assess the conduct of all parties to
determine whether it was the intention of each that the conduct of all other parties be affected.

Id.
281. Woodpulp, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
Hearing).

-,

4 C.M.L.R. at 914 (Report to the
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In presenting what might be described as its "conduct" test, the
Commission acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing 'the effects' of 'conduct' from the conduct itself. 22 The Commission,
however, defined "effects" as "the direct and perceivable consequences of certain 'conduct."' The Commission continued, "[tihe
distinction to be made is thus between 'conduct' which distorts the
competitive process in the Community and 'conduct' which, though
not itself distorting the competitive process within the Community,
produces such consequences.'283 It is the former situation which char-

acterizes the woodpulp producers' concerted actions, and which will
now invoke the jurisdictional reach of the EEC.
In upholding the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction, the Court
stated that the decisive criterion for establishing jurisdiction under
an Article 85 violation was a determination of where the restrictive
practices were implemented, not where they originated.2 4 The Court
reasoned that if a finding of jurisdiction-and thus the application
of Article 85 prohibitions-centered on the place where the alleged
violations were formed (as the woodpulp producers maintained),
undertakings could easily evade Community restrictions simply by
entering violative agreements beyond the frontiers of the EEC. 21 "It
is immaterial," wrote the Court, "whether or not [non-EEC entities]
had recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches within
the Community in order to make their contacts with purchasers
within the Community. ' 28 6 The Court concluded that application of
EEC competition rules was in conformity with the widely recognized
territorial basis of jurisdiction since the producers implemented their
pricing scheme within the EEC.2 7
Since the Court resolved the issue of extraterritoriality in Dyestuffs
by imputing actions of foreign-based parent companies to their EECbased subsidiaries, the absence of such subsidiaries in the Woodpulp
cases necessitated a greater expansion of jurisdictional doctrine. Instead of looking to the ultimate effects of anti-competitive conduct
as its test for jurisdiction, the Court focused on the initial implementation of conduct which leads to such effects. The Court explained:

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 941.
Id.
Woodpulp, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
-, 4 C.M.L.R. at 941.
Id. See supra note 248 (discussing the principle of territoriality).
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It follows that where those producers concert on the prices to be
charged to their customers in the Community and put that concertation into effect by selling at prices which are actually co-ordinated,
they are taking part in concertation which has the object and effect
of restricting competition within the Common Market within the
meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty.?8
Therefore, the Court reasoned, where enterprises employ anti-competitive practices in marketing their products within the Community,
the Commission can exert jurisdiction as a consequence of the specific
practices themselves.
In sum, the Woodpulp decision now subjects non-EEC based
enterprises doing business within the Community to EEC competition
rules if their actions affect the EEC internal market as defined by
Article 85. Thus, if they have "as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market,"
as determined by the Commission and Court, violations and fines
may be cited."289 According to Advocate General Darmon, "The
wording of Article 85 of the Treaty offers general support for the
proposition that Community competition law is applicable, by its
very essence, whenever anti-competitive effects have been produced
' 29
within the territory of the Community. " 0
Considering that the Court upheld the Commission's formulation
and exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Woodpulp, the question
which remains unanswered is where the Court will ultimately draw
the line on the extent of EEC jurisdiction. In both the Dyestuffs and
Woodpulp cases, the Court adopted the least expansive means of
exercising jurisdiction over the offending parties. Consequently, these
cases do not necessarily provide a definitive statement of the true
extraterritorial scope of EEC law. This question of scope will undoubtedly come before the Court in the future now that the Court
has extended the EEC's jurisdictional reach.
CONCLUSION

As the EEC prepares for the transition to the broader economic
and social unification of 1992, developments of the past year provide
important insights into the role of the Court in securing European
integration. The establishment of the Court of First Instance bodes

288.
289.
290.

Id. at 941.
See supra, note 18 and accompanying text (discussing Article 85).
Woodpulp, 4 C.M.L.R. at 918 (Advocate General Opinion).

The TransnationalLawyer / VoL 2

well for an increased role of Court of Justice jurisprudence. As the
EEC begins to face the increasingly difficult challenge of harmonizing
national economic and social policies with the broader Community
mandates of 1992, the Court will undoubtedly be called upon to
interpret new confrontations between national and Community law.
As such, the Court will certainly benefit from the relinquishment of
previously burdensome individual actions. EEC competition policy,
exemplified in this article by the Court's handling of restrictive pricing
practices and patent rights abuses, will continue to provide the crucial
vehicle for securing integration of Community economic policy. While
critics may continue to question the broad mandate of the Court, if
the ambitious integration goals of the EEC are to withstand the
pressures of national interests, the Court must continue to provide
an active and expansive application of Community law. Some of the
recent developments of the Court outlined in this article, including
the notable Woodpulp decision, provide a significant indication of
the Court's powerful role in forging greater European integration in
the coming decade.
Richard Paton

